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Article
Raise the Proof:
A Default Rule for Indigent Defense
ADAM M. GERSHOWITZ

Almost everyone agrees that indigent defense in America is underfunded, but workable solutions have been hard to come by. For the most
part, courts have been unwilling to inject themselves into legislative budget
decisions. And, when courts have become involved and issued favorable
decisions, the benefits have been only temporary because once the
pressure of litigation disappears so does a legislature's desire to
appropriate more funding. This Article proposes that if an indigent
defense system is under-funded, the state supreme court should impose a
default rule raising the standard ofproof to "beyond all doubt" to convict
indigent defendants. The legislature would then have the opportunity to
opt out of this higher standard of proof by providing enough funding to
bring defense lawyers ' caseloads within well-recognized standards or by
providing funding parity with prosecutors' offices. Such an approach will
create an incentive for legislatures to adequately fund indigent defense
without miring courts in detailed supervision of legislative budget
decisions. At the same time, because courts can check once per year to
determine whether there is funding parity with prosecutors ' offices or
compliance with caseload guidelines, there will be constant pressure on
legislatures to maintain adequate funding in order to avoid the higher
standard ofproof
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Raise the Proof:
A Default Rule for Indigent Defense
ADAM M. GERSHOWITZ•

I. INTRODUCJ'ION

Indigent defense in America is woefully under-funded. 1 Due to a lack
of resources, many public defenders are forced to carry hundreds of cases,
far in excess of recommended standards. 2 Jurisdictions that appoint
lawyers on an individual basis often pay them trifles to defend serious
felonies. 3 And to add insult to injury, defense lawyers in many
jurisdictions are paid substantially less than their prosecutor counterparts. 4
Each year, the states spend more than $5 billion on prosecuting criminal
cases, plus additional billions of dollars on police and crime labs that are
used to assist prosecutors, compared with less than $3 billion for indigent
defense. 5
The results of under-funding indigent defense are not surprising. 6 Poor
' Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I am grateful to Stephanos Bibas,
Toby Heytens, Randy Kelso, Erik Lillquist, Paul Marcus, Usha Rodrigues, and Ron Wright for helpful
comments, and to Matthew Cavenaugh, Elizabeth Drought, and Monica Ortale for research assistance.
1
For the most comprehensive in a long line of articles chronicling the under-funding of indigent
defense and its consequences, see Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006).
2
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783,816 (discussing
the lack of funding for public defender programs).
3
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853-55 (1994)(analyzing the law fees paid to lawyers
in capital cases); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the
Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 847-48 (2004) (discussing divergence in fees paid to
private attorneys who represent the government as opposed to indigent defendants).
4
See, e.g., Scott Wallace, Parity: The Fail Safe Standard, in I U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATION
OF
DEFENSE
SYSTEMS
13,
16
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj .gov/indigentdefense/compendiurn!pdftxt/voll. pdf ("Salary parity remains the
exception rather than the rule, among smaller programs."); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 34 (2004) available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf [hereinafter
VIRGINIA REPORT] ("Average pay in the offices is $64,000 for [prosecutors] and $46,000 for assistant
public defenders.").
s STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Ass'N, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 13-14 (2004),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defenderlbrokenpromise/fullreport.pdf
[hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE].
6
Scholars have recognized that most problems with indigent defense systems stem from the lack
of funding. See Bright, supra note 2, at 816 (''The most fundamental reason for the poor quality or
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defendants receive inadequate representation, wrongful convictions occur,
longer prison terms are meted out to indigent defendants, and confidence in
the criminal justice system is decimated. 7 In short, unlike other areas of
law, everyone is in agreement: the under-funding of indigent defense is a
serious problem. 8
There is no shortage of proposals for dealing with the problem. The
American Bar Association and legal scholars have advocated requiring
funding parity between prosecutors and defense lawyers. 9 White-shoe law
firms have brought litigation that demands increased funding, removal of
caps on the fees paid to appointed lawyers, and judicial supervision of the
criminal justice system. 10 Still other observers have suggested making it
easier to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on post-conviction
review. 11
Unfortunately, while some of these efforts had initial success, the
improvements were short-term and already have dissipated. 12 And the
successes have been the exception, not the rule. More often than not,
absence of legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the refusal of governments to
allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs."); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1620 (2002) ("Poor training, perverse
incentives, and massive caseloads [among many other consequences] all stem from the lack of
resources devoted to criminal defense."); Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic
Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 373 (2004)
("(F]unding is conceivably related to every other problem in indigent defense.").
7
See Note, Gideon's Promise Unfo/filled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense,
113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2000) (describing the "systemic impact of the poor quality of indigent
defense counsel") [hereinafter Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled].
8
See Lee, supra note 6, at 370 ("A survey of the literature unearths many scholars and
practitioners criticizing, and lamenting, the state of indigent defense. Their conclusions are more or
less the same: our indigent defense system is in a state of crisis."); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 10 (1997) ("[T)hose
familiar with the system agree that the story these numbers tell is generally true: Public defenders are
terribly overburdened.").
9
See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA TEN PRINCIPLES
OF
A
PuBLIC
DEFENSE
DELIVERY
SYSTEM
I
(2002)
available
at
http://www.abanet.org!legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf
(''There [should be] parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to
resources .... "); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REv. 219 (2004) (arguing for resource parity, but suggesting it may come
from legislative action without court intervention); Wallace, supra note 4, at 14 ("The U.S. Department
of Justice endorsed the concept of parity in the same year that Gideon v. Wainwright was handed
down.") (internal emphasis added).
10
See infra Part II (discussing the difference in spending between prosecutors and indigent
defense attorneys).
11
See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (shifting burden to government to rebut
presumption of ineffectiveness); Rebecca Kunkel, Note, Equalizing the Right to Counsel, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 843, 858 (2005) (considering whether the government should bear the burden of
proving effective assistance of counsel); Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent
Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435,437 (2003-2004) (reviewing the standards of
review applied in ineffective assistance cases).
12
See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1736 (2005) [hereinafter Effectively Ineffective] ("[T)hese
decisions have ultimately had less of a practical, sustainable impact than many had hoped.").
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reform efforts have won praise from local newspaper editorials, but failed
to convince the judiciary to intervene. 13 In refusing to get involved, courts
have pointed to abstention doctrine, separation of powers concerns, and the
general fear that courts should not be in the business of micromanaging
legislative budget decisions. 14
The challenge, therefore, is to offer a reform proposal that steers clear
of courts' concerns about micro-management and over-reaching. To effect
sustainable change, the judiciary should not, by itself, attempt to fix
foundering indigent defense systems. Rather, the courts should seek to
motivate the legislatures to fix the problem by imposing an unattractive
default rule that will operate in the absence of legislative action. 15 The
default rule should be simple, bright-line, and unequivocally within the
province of the judiciary. Such criteria eliminate the most common
proposals for remedying the indigent defense crisis, such as the suggestion
that courts undertake the traditionally legislative task of ordering the
expenditure of particular sums of money. 16 Similarly, proposals that
involve long-term judicial monitoring of indigent defense systems are
neither bright-line rules nor, as experience has taught, simple. 17
There is an easier way. A bright-line and classically judicial solution
would be for courts facing under-funded indigent defense systems to create
a default rule raising the standard of proof in all criminal cases against
indigent defendants. Rather than the traditional "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, the prosecution would shoulder the burden to prove
indigent defendants guilty under a higher "beyond all doubt" standard.
Because the "beyond all doubt" standard of proof would be a default rule,
legislatures would be free to opt out if they adequately fund their indigent
defense systems. To keep matters simple, legislatures could demonstrate
adequate funding in either of two (and only two) bright-line ways: (1) the
caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers do not exceed the
recommended guideposts set by the National Advisory Commission on
13
Compare Editorial, Passing the Buck on Defendants' Rights, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 6,
2003, at 84 (criticizing the lack of funding for Mississippi public defenders) with Quitman County v.
Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005) (rejecting constitutional challenge to lack of state funding for
indigent defense).
14
See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
IS See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV . 780,
827 (2006) (discussing the concept of "a default rule that is unattractive by design, so that politicians
have an incentive to pick an appropriate conduct rule themselves").
16
For an early article analyzing such judicial involvement, see Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978).
17
See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public LAw Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. lOIS, 1052 (2004) ("In all of these areas, though varying degrees, there
has been a tendency for remedial practice to move away from command-and-control toward
experimentalist methods.") . Scholars disagree about the extent to which courts are continuing to
impose structural injunctions. For a helpful summary of the literature and an argument that such
injunctions have not died, but rather become more focused, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study ofJail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006).
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Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, or (2) the funds appropriated for
indigent defense are equal to the funds appropriated for prosecutors'
offices. 18
Legislatures would be free to decide how to achieve either (or both) of
these scenarios. They could appropriate more money for indigent defense,
or they could encourage (or even require) prosecutors to charge fewer
defendants, thus reducing the caseloads of government-funded defense
lawyers. While the possibilities for implementation are numerous, the
outcome should be predictable: prosecutors hostile to a higher standard of
proof will lobby the legislature to ensure adequate indigent defense
funding, and legislators seeking to be tough on crime will move quickly to
ensure that an unnecessarily high standard of proof will not remain intact. 19
Put simply, a default rule imposed by the judiciary will create a strong
incentive for the key players in the criminal justice system to provide
adequate funding for indigent defense.
This Article begins with a brief overview of the under-funding of
indigent defense in the United States and the massive problems it creates.
Part ill then reviews the litigation efforts that have been made to solve the
funding crisis. Part ill discusses why most of the proposals have failed
outright or resulted only in short-term successes. Part IV then examines
the traditional proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard and argues that it
would be permissible for the Court to impose a higher standard in cases
involving indigent defendants. Part V advocates that the higher standard of
proof operate as a default rule. Legislatures could opt out of the higher
standard of proof by ensuring that caseloads remain within accepted
guidelines or by funding defense resources at the same level as prosecution
resources. Part V explains that such a solution has the virtue of
maximizing institutional competence. The proposal calls on the judiciary
to serve its traditional function of imposing legal standards, while asking
the legislature to fulfill its typical job of funding and implementing public
policy.

18
Other scholars have advocated variations of these proposals, though not as a default rule linked
to a heightened standard of proof. See Wright, supra note 9 (arguing for resource parity but suggesting
it may come from legislative action without court intervention); Gideon's Promise Unfolfilled, supra
note 7, at 2073 (noting in passing that imposing the ABA caseload guidelines would require "little
judicial inventiveness or lawmaking" and "would require little ongoing judicial management").
19
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 534
(200 l) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (explaining that "at the most basic level, elected
legislators and elected prosecutors are natural allies. Both need to please voters in order to survive, and
for both, pleasing voters means essentially the same thing: punishing people voters want to see
punished").
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II. THE INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING CRISIS

A. The Under-funding Problem

There is no serious dispute that indigent defense is under-funded. As
one commenter recently explained: "[S]tate and federal governments
together allocate over half of their criminal justice spending to the
investigation and prosecution of crimes but only about two percent to
indigent defense." 2 For instance, in 1998, the federal government spent
nearly $5.5 billion to fund the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Attorneys' offices, but less than
$400 million on indigent defense. 21 Matters at the state level are no better.
In a typical year, the states spend more than $5 billion to prosecute
criminal cases compared with less than $3 billion for indigent defense. 22 A
2000 report by the Department of Justice concluded that indigent defense
"is in a chronic state of crisis" in large part because "funding has not kept
pace with other components of the criminal justice system. " 23
Unfortunately, the under-funding problem is national in scope. A
review of Harris County, Texas-which has been the scene of legendary
stories about sleeping and drunk lawyers 24 -revealed that the highly
capable District Attorney's office spent $26 million in 1999, compared
with $11.6 million for indigent defense. 25 In Louisiana, a recent study
found that prosecutors outspent government-funded defense lawyers by a
three-to-one margin, and those figures did not account for the extra support
prosecutors receive from police investigators and state crime labs, which
are funded separately. 26 In 2000, Mississippi spent more than $16 million

°

20

Lee, supra note 6, at 373.

21

!d.

22
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 13-14. As one noted observer has explained,
"poor defendants receive only an eighth of the resources per case available to prosecutors." DEBORAH
L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004 ).
23
NAT'L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, IMPROVING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH ExPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS,
at ix (2000), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefenselicjs.pdf.
24
See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts
About System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File
(describing the late Joe Frank Cannon, a lawyer in Harris County who repeatedly was appointed to
handle capital cases even though he had ten separate clients sentenced to death and reportedly fell
asleep during a number of their trials).
25
Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County Courts; Those Using Appointed
Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1999, at AI, available at LEXIS,
News Library, HCHRN File. The imbalance is not quite as big as it appears, however. Throughout the
United States, approximately 20% of criminal defendants hire private attorneys. See CAROLINE WOLF
HARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 5 (2000),
available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/dccc.htm (stating that 80% of felony defendants are
indigent). Thus, while the District Attorney's office needs funding to prosecute I 00% of crimes, the
indigent defense system only needs funding to defend 80% of the cases. Nevertheless, the funding
difference in Harris County is still far out of balance.
26
See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN
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to prosecute felony cases while less than $9 million was spent on indigent
defense. 27 As one observer recently detailed:
As late as 2000, defenders in one Georgia county were paid
an average of $49.86 per case. Indeed in some states,
teenagers selling sodas on the beach can earn more than
court- appointed counsel. In Wayne County, Michigan,
assigned counsel made, after deducting overhead, $6 to $12
per hour . . . Minnesota's 386 full-time public defenders
worked 35,000 unpaid overtime hours in 2002, essentially
meaning that part-time lawyers worked full time, and fulltime lawyers worked nights and weekends to get the job
done. 28
While there have been improvements in certain localities, for many
jurisdictions the situation is becoming worse. 29 The City of Pittsburgh cut
funding for twelve of the city's fifty-seven public defenders even though
the judge heading the criminal division had recommended against such
cuts. 30 Due to budget shortfalls, Connecticut reduced funding for more
than half of fifty-one attorneys and support staff that had recently been
hired as part of a settlement to litigation challenging excessive caseloads. 31
In many jurisdictions, state governments contribute little or no money to
indigent defense, requiring county governments to shoulder the entire
burden themselves. 32 In counties with tight budgets, it is nearly impossible
to find the necessary funding.
B. The Results of Under-funding

The most obvious problem caused by the under-funding of indigent
defense is that jurisdictions cannot hire a sufficient number of lawyers,
leaving existing staff with excessive caseloads. The excessive caseloads in
ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LoUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER GIDEON
53
(2004)
available
at
hnp://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/l 078863541.49/Avoyelles%20Parsh%20Body%20Text. pdf
[hereinafter IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE]; Catherine Beane, Gideon Shattered: Justice
Stands Still in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, CHAMPION, Mar. 27, 2004, at *6, **8-9, available at
LEXIS, News Library, CHAMP File.
27
Erin V. Everett, Comment, Salvation Lies Within: Why the Mississippi Supreme Court Can and
Should Step in to Solve Mississippi's Indigent Defense Crisis, 74 MISS. L.J. 213,219-20 (2004).
28
Lee, supra note 6, at 375-76 {internal quotations and citations omitted).
29
See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 8, at 9-10 ("[S]pending on indigent defendants in constant dollars
per case appears to have declined significantly between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.").
30
See Bright, supra note 2, at 817 (citing Jan Ackerman, Public Defenders Feel Betrayed by
Heavy-Handed County Axing, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 27, 1996, at Bl, available at LEXIS,
News Library, PSTGAZ File).
31
Kellie A. Wagner, Advocates: States Not Rising to Call of Gideon, LEGAL INTEU.IGENCER,
Mar. 18, 2003, available at WESTLAW, Legal News Library, TLI File.
32
See, e.g., Everett, supra note 27, at 224 ("With the exception of death penalty cases, the State of
Mississippi does not contribute one dollar towards the representation of poor defendants.").
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tum lead to a host of additional problems.
Because lawyers are
overwhelmed, they lack the time to promptly meet with their clients,
leaving indigent defendants to languish in jail for egregiously long periods
of time without ever speaking to a lawyer. When lawyers do meet with
their clients, they often pressure the defendants to plead guilty irrespective
of the merits of the case because of the lack of time to prepare for and
conduct a trial. Those defendants who do insist on proceeding to trial are
handicapped with inexperienced, overwhelmed, or incompetent lawyers
who lack the funds for basic litigation resources such as investigators and
expert witnesses. The hurried plea bargains and rushed trials result in
convictions of some factually innocent defendants and in harsher sentences
than those meted out to comparable non-indigent defendants. As explained
in more detail below, the under-funding of indigent defense pervades every
step of the criminal justice process.
1. Excessive Caseloads

First, the lack of funding for indigent defense means that most public
defenders (and many appointed counsel) are handling excessive
caseloads. 33 The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals-a national body established by the Department of
Justice to implement recommendations from the President's 1968 Crime
Commission-has recommended that public defenders handle no more
than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors in any year. 34 The National Legal
Aid and Defender Association has endorsed these guideposts, 35 and the
American Bar Association has cited them approvingly multiple times. 36
Commentators have recognized that these caseload standards "have been
widely adopted and proven quite durable." 37 Yet, public defenders in
Connecticut sometimes each handle more than 1,000 cases per year. 38 A
recent study of Virginia's indigent defense system found that in most local
jurisdictions public defenders were carrying between 100 and 200 open
cases at any given time, far in excess of recommended standards. 39 One
overwhelmed lawyer explained that because the public defenders have so
33

Lee, supra note 6, at 377-78.
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS, at Standard
13.12 (1973).
35
See STANDARDS FOR DEFENSE 13.12, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, DEFENDER
RESOURCES,
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Defender_Standards_NLADA
(referring to the standards promulgated by the National Commission on Criminal Justice and Goals)
(last visited August 26, 2007).
36
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 17-18; THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, KEEPING
DEFENDER
WORKLOADS
MANAGEABLE
8
(2001),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllbja/185632.pdf.
37
Scott Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards,
31 S.U. L REv. 245, 269 (2004).
38
Wagner, supra note 31.
39
VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-29.
34
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many open cases, "we let things slide. We cannot help it. We don't have
40
time for investigation or research."
A Minnesota public defender recently quit his job after handling 135
felony cases, nearly 400 misdemeanors, and nearly 200 other matters in a
single year. 41 He was doing the job of at least two full-time lawyers. In a
seven-month period, a single public defender in Louisiana represented 418
defendants. 42 A more recent Louisiana study found that a part-time public
defender in Avoyelles Parish was paid $19,200 to handle all of the
jurisdiction's 1008 misdemeanor cases and 256 juvenile cases. Without
taking into account the felony arraignments he was expected to staff and
the additional private cases he also maintained, the "part-time" public
defender was handling four-and-a-half times as many cases as national
caseload guidelines recommend. 43 In another Louisiana parish, public
defenders, in addition to defending private clients, carry an average open
caseload of 590 felonies and 150 misdemeanors, far in excess of national
guidelines. 44 And so the story goes throughout the United States.
2. Lengthy Delays Before Meeting With Lawyers
Because of their crushing caseloads, many defense lawyers lack the
time to meet with their clients, instead spending almost their entire
workday in triage, negotiating guilty pleas on the eve of trial and, in worstcase situations, actually trying cases. 45 Under these circumstances, overburdened public defenders have little time for the "less important" task of
visiting their clients in jail and pushing for speedy bail hearings. For
instance, a study of Calcasieu Parish in Louisiana found that public
defenders who represented 85% of the inmates made 31 jailhouse visits,
while private lawyers who represented 15% of the inmates made 236 visits
during the same time-period. 46 The American Bar Association recently
reported that defendants in Montana "remain in pretrial detention for up to
five to six months without a single contact from an attorney." 47 In
Mississippi, a woman who was arrested for stealing $200 spent eight
40

/d. at 28-29 (quotations omitted).
Conrad deFiebre, Public Defenders Seek Lighter Load; With Its Attorneys Overworked, the
Board ofPublic Defense Has Asked the State's High Court for Help, STAR TRlBUNE, Aug. 30,2003, at
IB, available at LEXIS, News Library, STRIB File. The average Minnesota public defender handles
more than 900 cases per year. Backus & Marcus, supra note I, at I 055-56.
42
See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780,784 (La. 1993).
43
Beane, supra note 26, at **12-13.
44
/d. at *16.
45
See Bright, supra note 2, at 790 (discussing "triage"); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal
Defense Entitlements: An Argument From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 801, 809 (2004)
(discussing the rationing of scarce resources).
46
Sylvia R. Cooks & Karen Karre Fontenot, The Messiah is Not Coming: It's Time for Louisiana
to Change its Method of Funding Indigent Defense, 31 S.U. L. REV. 197,209 (2004) (citing MICHAEL
M. KURTH & DARYL V. BURCKET, DEFENDING THE INDIGENT IN SOUTiiWEST LoUISIANA 33 (2004)).
47
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 23.
41
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months in jail without ever seeing a lawyer. Eventually, she gave up
hope of receiving a lawyer and pled guilty to time served just to get out
. '149
Jal.
The problem is just as serious in jurisdictions that utilize appointed
counsel systems. Because many jurisdictions cap the total fees that
appointed counsel recover, defense lawyers reap diminishing returns for
each extra hour they work on a case. 5° This creates a strong disincentive to
make extra trips to the jail to meet with indigent clients prior to their
arraignments. The fee caps imposed by the Commonwealth of Virginia are
instructive. Virginia pays appointed lawyers at a rate of $90 per hour, but
caps the payment for serious felonies at $395.51 Thus, after four-and-a-half
hours of work, the appointed lawyer is working for free, hardly an
incentive to take time-consuming trips to the local jail to meet promptly
with new clients. As a result, many appointed lawyers behave strategically
and wait until they have been assigned a substantial number of new clients
before going to the local jail to meet with any of them. As one appointed
lawyer candidly explained, "[I] will wait three to four weeks after
appointment to visit in-custody clients so [I] can visit six or seven in the
same trip to the jail. " 52
3. Assembly Line Guilty Pleas

When indigent defendants do meet with their lawyers, they are often
afforded assembly-line justice. Because defense lawyers have more cases
than they can handle, they have a strong incentive to plead the cases out,
and to do so quickly. 53 The problem is particularly vexing in jurisdictions
that subject appointed counsel to fee caps because each additional hour
worked provides diminishing returns or no payment whatsoever. 54 As one
appointed lawyer explained, "in a court-appointed case [we spend] as little
time as possible ... 'if we want to make a living we have to get rid of the
case as quickly as possible. "' 55 Not surprisingly, a study of New York City
/d.
/d.; see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1032-34 (recounting other egregious stories).
50
See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 10 ("The real key to the statutory fee schedules, however, is not the
hourly amounts but the caps on total fees. Most states have such caps.").
51
See VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-163 (2007). The statute actually authorizes $445 per felony charge,
but the legislature has not provided adequate funding. VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 48.
52
VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
53
See Sablatura, supra note 25 (quoting Professor David Dow saying that "[p]art of the problem
is that indigent cases pay so little that a court-appointed attorney needs a Jot of cases to make a
living ... [a]nd the only way for attorneys to handle a large number of cases is to plead out as many
clients as they can as fast as they can").
54
See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 911, 922 (2006) ("[D]efense lawyers who receive flat or capped fees can earn more if they have
high turnover. The press of large caseloads and limited funding and support staff also pushes many
lawyers and judges to settle quickly, before investing much work.").
55
VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 50.
48
49
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found that government-funded lawyers filed substantially fewer motions
than retained counsel. 56
The situation is actually worse in jurisdictions that use low-bid
contractors for their indigent defense cases because such lawyers have no
incentive to do anything other than plead defendants guilty. For instance,
McDuffie County, Georgia, assigned all of its indigent defense cases to a
lawyer who offered to handle the cases for about half as much payment as
any other bidder. 57 Over a five-year period, that lawyer encouraged
hundreds of defendants to plead guilty while conducting only two jury
trials and filing only seven pre-trial motions. 58 Needless to say, the lawyer
conducted no factual or legal investigation of his clients' cases and, in
most instances, met with them only moments before they plead guilty. 59
The American Bar Association has reported that over a five-year
period in Quitman County, Mississippi, 42% of indigent defense cases
were resolved by guilty pleas when the defense lawyer first met the
defendant at his arraignment. 60 Obviously, the defense lawyer did not
conduct a thorough interview with the client, meet the witnesses, or visit
the crime scene. In Clark County, Nevada, which employs seventy
lawyers, approximately 99.5% of cases are resolved without going to
trial. 61 Worse yet, a Montana lawyer, who had a contract to handle all of a
county's indigent defense cases, "once bragged to the chief prosecutor in
his county that 'he got out of the 1990s without a trial. "'62
4. Incompetent and Under-Resourced Trial Lawyers

Because funding for indigent defense is so low, competent lawyers
usually refuse to take appointed cases. As a Virginia prosecutor explained:
Very few experienced attorneys are on those [courtappointed] lists, and the reason is, they can't afford to be on
them. So you either have very inexperienced attorneys right
out of law school for whom any money is better than no
money. Or you have people who are really bad lawyers who

56
Michael McConville & Chesler L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 767-70 (1986-1987); see also Darryl K. Brown, Defense
Attorney Discretion to Ration Services and Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 212
(2003) ("Attorneys are assigned more cases than they can plausibly handle, so that each client has
formal representation but the quantity and quality of representation is constrained. Attorneys forgo
motion practice, investigation options, and witness preparation.").
57
Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent
Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808, 1808-09 (2000).
58
/d. at 1809.
59 /d.
60
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra nole 5, at 16.
61
/d. at 19.

62/d.
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can't make a living except off the court-appointed list.

97
63

Moreover, even though some appointed lawyers and public defenders
are competent lawyers, these attorneys often lack the tools to provide a
competent defense. While prosecutors have access to police investigators
and forensic labs, most defense lawyers lack the funding for similar
resources. 64 At most, the typical public defender office has one or two
investigators struggling to work on thousands of cases per year. 65 Due to a
lack of resources, many courts either refuse funding for expert witness or
only allot a trivial amount of money. 66 Additionally, government-funded
lawyers often have inadequate access to basic legal tools such as law
libraries, internet access, fax machines, and clerical support. 67 For
instance, a recent investigation of Louisiana found that one prosecutor's
office had recently undergone an $850,000 renovation and "exude[d]
professionalism," while the indigent defense board was "in disarray," with
no receptionist and papers and case files piled in the hallway. 68
5. Wrongful Convictions, Unjust Sentences, and Defaulted Appeals
When indigent defendants proceed to trial they are often represented
either by incompetent lawyers, attorneys handling too many cases to
perform satisfactorily, or competent lawyers who lack the resources to put
forth an adequate defense. Not surprisingly, these indigent defendants are
almost always found guilty at trial. 69 And while most criminal defendants
63
Laura LaFay, Virginia's Poor Receive Justice on the Cheap: Rock-Bottom Pay for CourtAppointed Lawyers Undermines System, Lawyer Says, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 15, 1998, at AI,
available at LEXIS, News library, V APILT File; see also VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 52

(quoting an attorney as saying that "[n]o attorney with any self respect will do these [appointed] cases
any longer than he has to").
64
See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE
CHIEF JUSTICE'S
COMMISSION ON
INDIGENT DEFENSE 67
(2002),
available at
http://www.georgiacourts.org/aodpress/iddidc.html ("[E]ven attorneys who feel an investigator or
expert would help in their cases are reluctant to file motions securing investigative help a) because it
will be a waste of time, as such requests are routinely denied and/or b) because it might annoy
judges.").
65
See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780,784 (La. 1993) (explaining that three investigators were
responsible for handling 7,000 cases per year); Beane, supra note 26, at *16 (explaining that in
Calcasieu Parish "the District Attorney's Office has 14 staff investigators as well as investigative
assistance from local law enforcement, [but] the Public Defender's Office has only two staff
investigators"); VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 4, at 38 (reporting that there are a total of twenty-six
investigators to handle all of the indigent defense cases in the Commonwealth of Virginia and that "the
vast majority of cases receive no investigative work"); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent:
Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739, 780--81 (explaining that most indigent
defendants "have little or no investigation done on their cases").
66
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 10--11; Backus & Marcus, supra note I, at 1099liOO.
67
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 10; VIRGINIA REPORT ,supra note 4, at 36-38.
68
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, supra note 26, at 54.
69
See Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior
Records and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRtM. JUST. 253, 258 (1989) (concluding that
defendants represented by public defenders have fewer trials and a greater number of convictions than
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are in fact guilty, wrongful convictions occur, and innocent indigent
defendants are at greater risk than those with retained counsel. The
Innocence Project, which has helped to free scores of innocent felons over
the last fifteen years, identifies the lack of funding for indigent defense as
one of the prime reasons for wrongful convictions. 70 In one recent case,
DNA technology exonerated a man who had served more than fifteen years
for child rape. 71 At trial, his appointed lawyer did not attempt to exclude
an equivocal eyewitness identification, filed no pre-trial motions,
undertook no investigation, presented no expert testimony, and failed to
even file an appeal. 72 The apparent reason for the appalling representation
(and the wrongful conviction) was that the lawyer had a flat-fee contract
with the county and received the same minimal compensation, regardless
of whether he prepared adequately or not. 73 Countless other innocent
victims surely languish in prison due to the inadequate representation they
received as a result of the under-funding of indigent defense. 74
Wrongful convictions are not the only problem however. Studies
demonstrate that defendants represented by under-funded defense lawyers
are sentenced to longer prison terms 75 than their non-indigent
counterparts. 76 Because most defendants plea bargain, sentencing is often
defendants represented by private counsel).
70
See Innocence Project: Bad Lawyering, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/BadLawyering.php); see also Adele Bernhard, Trends in Defense Services Standards, in 1 U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: STANDARDS FOR
ADMINISTRATION
OF
DEFENSE
SYSTEMS
20
(2000),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendium/standardsvllvlintro.htm ("In every study of
wrongful convictions, investigators inevitably conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel [or] bad
lawyering has played a significant role.").
71
Innocence Project: Jimmy Ray Bromgard, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/6l.php
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
72
Lefstein, supra note 3, at 860.
73 /d.
74
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS FROM EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Lefstein, supra note 3, at 858--{)0 (describing
the prospect of thousands of wrongful convictions each year and explaining that "[n]either the number
of mistakes attributable to defense counsel errors nor the exact number of wrongful convictions can
ever be known"). On the problem of innocent defendants pleading guilty to avoid the risks of trial with
a poor defense lawyer, see Uphoff, supra note 65, at 796-802.
1
s See generally Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness:
Self-Selection By the "Marginally Indigent', 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2005) (finding that Denver
public defenders achieved worse sentencing outcomes for their clients than private defense counsel but
cautioning that the results may be due to "marginally-indigent" defendants who know they have worse
cases opting for public defenders rather than scraping together the money to pay private counsel in a
losing battle); see also Sablatura, supra note 25, at AI ("Criminal defendants in Harris County
represented by court-appointed attorneys were twice as likely to be sentenced to jail or prison than
defendants with money to hire their own lawyers .... ");Champion, supra note 69, at 261 (studying
1175 cases and finding that for plea agreements secured by public defenders "the incarceration periods
were significantly longer compared with lengths of incarceration contained in plea agreements
involving private attorneys").
76
Moreover, because some of the most appalling representation occurs in capital cases, indigent
defendants face greater risks of being sentenced to death. For instance, the infamous Joe Frank
Cannon-the late Houston lawyer who repeatedly was appointed to cases even though he had slept
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determined by the attorneys' deal-making skills. Given that the extremely
complicated federal and state sentencing guidelines (and the cases
interpreting them) are thousands of pages long, savvy and hard-working
lawyers have considerable room to negotiate during plea bargaining, thus
ensuring better sentencing deals than those procured by inexperienced or
over-worked lawyers. 77 In this respect, indigent defendants represented by
public defenders (who are repeat players) may be better off than defendants
represented by appointed lawyers. Yet, even the hardest working public
defenders-many of whom are quite savvy-are handicapped by a lack of
time to explore and research potentially helpful sentencing issues.
Additionally, as Professor Stephanos Bibas has pointed out, because
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences pervade criminal law,
"[k]nowledgeable defense lawyers who act quickly may strike early
charge-bargains before a grand jury indicts" thus guaranteeing
substantially lower sentences. 78 By contrast, overwhelmed governmentfunded lawyers typically do not meet with their clients until well after
indictment and therefore have no opportunity to utilize this tactic in the
hopes of securing a lower sentence.
Finally, indigent defendants suffer on appeal as well. A recent review
of defaulted appeals in Virginia found that public defenders and courtappointed lawyers were responsible for more than 70% of the defaults. 79
Either because these lawyers were too busy or too incompetent, they failed
to file the simple piece of paper necessary to preserve an appeal. More
disheartening, judges continued to appoint these lawyers to represent
indigent defendants, including one lawyer who defaulted six appeals in a
single year. 80
In sum, because the fees paid to appointed lawyers are so low, quality
lawyers refuse to take the cases and judges have no choice but to reappoint incompetent or overwhelmed lawyers. Indigent defendants suffer
during pre-trial discovery, at motion practice, during trial, at sentencing,
through prior trials--saw ten of his clients go to death row. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note
2, at 789; see also Barrett, supra note 24 (noting that "Mr. Cannon's collection of 10 death sentences is
one of the largest among active lawyers). For an account of "the ineptitude" of a court-appointed
lawyer representing a death-row inmate see David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl
Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REv. 691, 694-95 (1996). Courts continue to appoint inadequate lawyers-even
in death-penalty cases-because the funding appropriated for indigent defense is far too low to attract
better Ia wyers.
71
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463,
2483-84 (2004) (explaining that "[c]omplexity favors intelligent, savvy repeat players who build up
expertise and who pool information" whereas "[g]uidelines neophytes, in contrast, may be ignorant of
these opportunities").
78
/d. at 2484.
79
Editorial, Courts of No Appeal, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at B6, available at LEXIS, News
Library, WPOST File.
80
Editorial, Inexcusable Delay, WASH. PosT, July 5, 2004, at Al6, available at LEXIS, News
library, WPOST File.
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and on appeal.
ill. THE REFORM ATTEMPTS: FAILURE OR FLEETING SUCCESSES

Frustrated with the lack of indigent defense funding, public defenders,
criminal defense associations, and law firms working in pro bono
capacities have brought litigation to demand increased funding for indigent
defense. The results have been disappointing. As detailed below, many
efforts have failed at the outset, with courts dismissing the litigation
outright. In other cases, legal victories have been achieved in court, only
to see the improvements vanish over time. 81
A. Outright Defeats

For more than a generation, the most obvious avenue for vindication of
criminal defendants' rights has been in federal court. 82 This is not so with
indigent defense, however.
Federal courts have rejected systemic
challenges to state indigent defense systems on abstention grounds. 83
Applying Younger abstention, courts have held that so long as there is an
available remedy in state court, federal courts should not interfere with
ongoing state criminal proceedings.
Many state courts also have been unsympathetic to systemic challenges
because the plaintiff bringing the case cannot personally point to
inadequate representation.
For instance, when a Minnesota public
defender sought a declaratory judgment that the indigent defense system
was unconstitutional because the lack of funding resulted in ineffective
assistance of counsel, the state supreme court rejected the challenge
because the indigent defendant could not demonstrate that his particular
lawyer was sub-standard. 84 Likewise, the Virginia Court of Appeals
rejected a challenge to fee caps that limited attorney recovery to less than
$400 per case because the lawyer bringing the challenge had "zealously"
represented his client. 85 Similar litigation efforts have failed in Alabama, 86
81

For the best analysis of the failed litigation efforts, see Wright, supra note 9, at 244-48.
For the classic article praising the ability of federal courts over state courts to protect individual
rights, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977). While the perception of
federal superiority has long existed, scholars have questioned whether it is in fact true. See generally
Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv . 1457 (2005) (discussing the
literature).
83
See Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 679 (II th Cir. 1992) ("This Court does not believe that it
should exercise its equitable jurisdiction in this case."); Wallace v. Kern, 520 F.2d 400, 408 (2d Cir.
1975) (reversing the order below because it "created an intrusion upon existing state criminal process
which is fissiparous and gratuitous .... "). For a criticism of federal courts' reluctance to intervene, see
Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent
Defense Services, 101 YALE L. J. 481 (1991).
84
Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1996).
85
Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). The focus on "actual
injury" is a particularly vexing problem because the lawyers who typically raise challenges to the
under-funding of indigent defense are themselves hardworking and effective, even in spite of their
82
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Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, Utah, and Vermont.
More creative challenges have failed as well. In Mississippi, clever
lawyers tried to attack the lack of state indigent defense funding by using a
county-rather than a criminal defendant-as the plaintiff and naming the
state as a defendant. Although a high-powered legal team represented the
county pro bono for more than five years, the Mississippi Supreme Court
flatly rejected the claim. 92
B. Settlement Victories ... Or So They Seemed

Not all litigation has failed outright however. In a handful of cases,
litigation has led to compromise legislation that has been lauded by the
media and some reform activists. Ultimately, however, the results of the
legislation have been unsatisfactory.
In 2003, the New York County Lawyer's Association (NYCLA)
convinced a trial judge that the rates for assigned counsel-$40 per hour
for in-court work and $25 per hour for out-of-court work-were so low as
to deny effective representation. 93 Recognizing that "it does not have the
capacity or the resources, nor is it in the best position to provide a
comprehensive ... solution," the court nevertheless ordered that rates be
raised to $90 per hour. 94 The court encouraged the legislature to get
involved, explaining that it is "in a better position to investigate, hold
hearings, formulate, debate, [and] identify funding sources ... to best meet
crushing caseloads. For instance, the lawyer who had the courage to bring the challenge in
Webb-Steven Benjamin-has served as President of the Virginia Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers and won the prestigious Lewis F. Powell pro bono award. Profile of Steven D. Benjamin,
Benjamin & Desportes, P.C., http://www.lawyers.com/benjamin&desportes/jsp2209433.jsp (last
visited Sept. 22, 2007).
86
See Ex Parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1985) ("We do not find that [a $500 cap on
expenses] contravenes the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.").
87
See Lewis v. Iowa Dist. Court, 555 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1996) ("[A]lthough the amount
awarded a court-appointed attorney may be less than what an attorney may charge a private client, the
guidelines themselves are not per se unreasonable.").
88
See Wayne County Criminal Def. Bar Ass'n v. Chief Judges of Wayne Cir. Court, 663 N.W.2d
471, 472 (Mich. 2003) (noting that the fee schedule adopted by the Wayne Circuit Courts does not
"fail[] to provide assigned counsel reasonable compensation"). Notably, earlier litigation efforts in
Michigan had proved successful, but sufficient benefits did not materialize. See Recorder's Bar Ass' n
v. Wa~ne County Court, 503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993).
9
See Madden V. Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 212 (N.J. 1992) (concluding that the government should
not be ordered to "pay attorneys who are assigned by the municipal court to represent defendants too
poor to pay for counsel").
90
See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 688 (Utah 1997) (upholding lower courts decision that the
minimal compensation provided to the defendant's attorney did not affect the attorney's "strategy and
efforts").
91
See State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54,66 (Vt. 1995) (holding that the "States failure to pay defense
counsel in a timely manner for expenses and services in connection with this case" does not create a
conflict of interest for the defending attorney).
92
Quitman County v. Mississippi, 910 So. 2d 1032 (Miss. 2005).
93
New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397,400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
94
/d. at 410.
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95

the needs of the assigned counsel scheme." Perhaps fearing a reversal, 96
the County Lawyer's Association accepted a settlement whereby the
legislature agreed to new rates of up to $75 per hour to take effect in
2004.97
Most observers counted the NYCLA case as a victory for indigent
defense, 98 yet the victory was hollow. As part of the compromise, the
legislation provided for a task force to be created to review the sufficiency
of assigned counsel rates and issue a report to the Governor and the
Legislature by January 15, 2006. Yet, no one was appointed to the task
force and no report was ever issued. 99 Accordingly, as one observer
recently remarked, "the rates will not be adjusted or even reviewed'' as was
intended by the compromise legislation, and "the state seems again on a
path where counsel rates remain stagnant for years as the basic ... living
expenses of attorneys increase." 100
Even more problematic, the increased fees for appointed counsel
resulting from the NYCLA litigation have actually made representation for
most indigent defendants worse. 101 Many New York jurisdictions rely on
both appointed counsel and public defenders, and the NYCLA decision only
mandated higher compensation for the former. Because the State of New
York did not provide sufficient funding to cover the higher fees for
appointed counsel, cash-strapped jurisdictions turned to cheaper and
already over-burdened public defenders to handle even more cases. 102 The
Legal Aid Society, which already provided the bulk of indigent defense
representation in New York City, was called upon to handle more cases,
yet it did not receive additional funding to deal with those cases. To the
contrary, budget shortfalls forced the Legal Aid Society to layoff 25% of

95/d.
96
Within a few weeks of the favorable court ruling, the City filed a notice of appeal which
prevented the judicially ordered rate increases from taking immediate effect. Susan Saulny, Court
Appeal Puts Off Raise for Poor Clients ' Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at 83, availilble at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
97
See N.Y. COUNTY LAw§ 722-b (McKinney 2007).
98
See Susan Saulny, Lawyers ' Fees to Defend the Poor Will Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2003, at Bl, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting NYCLA Vice President's response
to the legislative compromise as a "major breakthrough" that is "having a ripple effect on indigentdefense systems across the country''); Susan Saulny, Judge Orders Rates Doubled for Lawyers for the
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting the
NYCLA Vice President's response to the court ruling as, "[t]his is great news").
99
COMM'N ON THE FuTuRE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE
STATEOFNEWYORK 12, 13 n.29 (2006).
100
John Caher, Report Calls for Replilcement of Indigent Defense System: Lack of Standards,
Inadequate Funds, Poor Training Cited, N.Y.L.J., Col. 3, June 29, 2006, at I, availilble at Westlaw,
Legal News Library, NYU File.
101
See id. rTnhe hard fought effort to increase assigned counsel rates ... actually had a negative
impact on indigent defense representation.").
102
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR
CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 153, !56 (2006).
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its support staff in 2004.103
Thus, three years after the NYCLA decision, a report by a nationally
recognized indigent defense expert concluded that "New York's indigent
defense system is in a serious state of crisis and suffers from an acute and
chronic lack of funding." 104
A similar tum of events recently occurred in Massachusetts. In 2004,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that indigent
defendants' constitutional rights were being violated because the state paid
attorneys so poorly-as little as $30 per hour-that it could no! attract
enough lawyers, leaving defendants to languish in jail. 105 The court did not
raise lawyers' hourly rates, but instead ordered that if defendants were not
provided with counsel within seven days of their arrest they would have to
be released. 106 About one year after the court's decision, the legislature
raised rates by $7.50 per hour, 107 and various groups declared victory. 108
Yet, the victory was short-lived. Within a year, the Massachusetts'
indigent defense commission ran out of money to pay its bills (including its
lawyers and investigators), and in the next budget session legislators
attempted to cut the funding necessary for the rate increases. 109 In any
event, even the nominal rate increases were not enough to satisfy local
attorneys and there continues to be a shortage of lawyers to handle
appointed cases. 110
C. Litigation Victories ... Or So They Seemed
More celebrated than the compromise legislation adopted in New York
and Massachusetts are the handful of decisions in which courts have
clearly ruled in favor of indigent defendants. Once again however, these
successes are less than meets the eye.
In the most famous decision, State v. Peart, the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered the plight of a defendant who was represented by a public
defender who had represented more than 400 defendants in a seven-month
103

ld. at 132, 163.

104

Jd. at 155.
Lavallee v. Justices, 812 N.E.2d 895, 899-901 (Mass. 2004).
Jd. at 901. A handful of defendants were released because appointed lawyers refused to
provide representation. Conor W. Daly, Avoiding a New Willie Horton Problem: Creating a Better
Public Counsel System in Massachusetts, 18 GEO. J.L. Ennes 679,684 (2005).
107
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 2110, § 11 (West 2007).
108
See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CASE HISTORY OF
REFORM 1 (2005) ("On July 29, 2005, the Massachusetts Legislature made significant changes to the
Massachusetts system of indigent defense and substantially increased the appropriation for indigent
defense services.").
109
See Noah Schaffer, Bar Advocate Monday is Gone, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 17,2006 ("[llhe
increase for private counsel slated to go through this year was stripped from the fiscal 2007 budget that
recently came out of a conference committee.").
110
Bar Advocates Say Raise Not Enough, CAPE Coo TiMEs, July 23, 2005, available at
http://www.bristolcpcs.org/CapeCod20050723.html.
105
106
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period and had a felony trial scheduled for every trial date on the docket. 111
The court labeled the indigent defense system a "crisis" and called on the
legislature to act. 112 In the interim, the court imposed a presumption that
all indigent defendants in an under-funded jurisdiction were receiving
ineffective assistance of counsel, and it placed the burden on the
government to rebut the ineffectiveness presumption. 113 The Supreme
Court further instructed trial judges that if they were not satisfied with the
level of representation they "shall not permit the prosecution to go forward
until the defendant is provided with reasonably effective assistance of
counsel." 114 Finally, the court threatened that if "legislative action is not
forthcoming and indigent defense reform does not take place" the court
"may find it necessary to employ more intrusive and specific measures." 115
At least initially, the court's decision in Peart had its desired effect.
The State of Louisiana increased funding for public defenders by $5
million and created a task force to study the situation. 116 The progress was
short-lived however. Judges presented with clearly guilty defendants have
been reluctant to enforce the Peart rule and possibly set guilty criminals
free. 117 More importantly, the rebuttable presumption of ineffective
assistance of counsel has not encouraged the legislature to enact further
funding increases, thereby allowing compensation rates. to stagnate. 118 As
one of the dissenting Justices in Peart complained, the court's decision
"failed to set forth any standards to give the legislative and executive
branches guidance in bringing the system into constitutional
compliance." 119
Thus, although the legislature provided some additional funding in the
wake of the Peart decision, in subsequent years the funding did not keep
up with inflation or continually increasing caseloads, 120 and Louisiana's

111
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 {La. 1993); see also GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra
note 5, at 2073 (discussing rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel).
112
Peart, 621 So. 2d at 790.
113
/d. at 791.
114
/d. at 792.
tts /d. at 791.
116
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42 LA. B.J. 454, 457-58
(1995).
117
As one Louisiana appellate judge has remarked, releasing defendants under ineffective
assistance of counsel theories "likely will result in heightening public distrust in the bench and bar.
Releasing defendants, who potentially represent a threat to the public, to solve an ill in the system is a
remedy far too risky to embrace when alternative solutions are available." Cooks & Fontenot, supra
note 46, at 213.
118
See id. at 209 (describing the local funding of indigent defense more than a decade after Peart
and explaining that the State of Louisiana contributes less than $2 per case); Wright, supra note 9, at
251 (''The heartening victory in the Peart litigation unraveled in less than a decade.").
119
Peart, 621 So. 2d at 795 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
120
Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1738; see also Wright, supra note 9, at 249 (describing
judicial solutions such as the one in Peart as "temporary").
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indigent defense system is still in tatters.
A trial court recently
"expressed its frustration with the continued lack of funding and the fact
that it faces some version of the same funding dilemma in virtually every
criminal case before it." 122 The trial court ordered the parish to set aside
hundreds of thousands of dollars for indigent defense, but the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts lacked authority to issue
such an order to the parishes. 123 The Supreme Court was left once again to
threaten the legislature, this time suggesting that if adequate funding is not
appropriated, defendants will be given the option to file motions to halt the
prosecution and possibly go free. 124 Much like the rebuttable presumption
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court's new threat to allow trial
judges to halt prosecutions is a flawed remedy because it shifts the burden
onto trial judges to analyze individual cases, rather than creating a
sufficient incentive for the legislature to act.
A similar problem bedeviled an otherwise promising decision by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. In State v. Lynch, the court relied on its
"inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law" to hold that a
cap on fees for appointed counsel violated the Oklahoma Constitution. 125
The court called on the legislature to address the problem, but in the
meantime it increased fees for appointed counsel to be equivalent to the
hourly rate for prosecutors. 126 As in Louisiana, the Supreme Court's action
initially led the legislature to appropriate more funding and to create a
supervisory indigent defense board. 127 Shortly thereafter, however,
Oklahoma moved to a low-bid contractor approach to indigent defense,
and funding for the indigent defense board began to dry up. 128 As one
observer remarked: "[W]hile the [Lynch] decision inspired change, it was
unable to sustain it." 129
The same problem occurred after a promising decision by the Supreme
Court of Arizona. In State v. Smith, the defendant contended that his
appointed lawyer, a contract attorney who was responsible for all of the
121
Beane, supra note 26, at *6; IN DEFENSE OF PuBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26, at v.
Matters have been made even worse by Hurricane Katrina. See Gwen Filosa, Judge Blasts Financing
for Indigent Defense, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), June 24, 2006, at I, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NOTPIC File (describing how Hurricane Kalrina caused more problems for an already
overburdened system); Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor lnmates Without Justice Since Hurricane,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("The criminal justice
system in New Orleans was notoriously troubled long before the storms, and if anything, it is now
worse.").
122
State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 329 (La. 2005).
123
/d. at 336.
124
ld. at 338.
125
State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Okla. 1990).
126
/d. at 1161. The Court also required compensation for reasonable overhead expenses. ld.
127
Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1739.
128/d.
129

/d. at 1740.
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city's cases, was so overwhelmed that he did not have more than a few
hours to devote to a burglary and sexual assault case. 130 The court looked
to the guidelines recommended by the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association- no more than 150 felonies or 300 misdemeanors per yearand found Smith's lawyer to be well in excess of those standards. 131
Without finding that Smith in particular had received ineffective assistance
of counsel, the court held that the lawyer's caseload was excessive and
unconstitutional under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. 132 The
court further stated that for future defendants represented by overburdened, low-bid contract lawyers, there would be a presumption that the
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, which the government
would have the burden of disproving. 133
Like Peart and Lynch, the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Smith
was initially successful. The county adopted a new system for hiring
counsel and it began to pay them more. 134 As with the other cases,
however, the benefits were ephemeral, with caseloads rising and attorney
compensation remaining stagnant in subsequent years. 135
To be sure, there have been cases in which litigation has succeeded in
improving indigent defense. In particular, a handful of courts have held
statutory caps on appointed counsel's fee recovery to be
unconstitutional. 136 Yet, the larger story is that many litigation efforts have
proven unsuccessful, and that even the cases lauded as "successful" efforts
have ultimately proven to be failures. 137
130

State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Ariz. 1984).
/d. at 1380. Of the systemic efforts to improve indigent defense funding, the Smith decision is
the closest parallel to the proposal I advocate in Parts IV and V because it tied funding to case limits
and imposed a default rule in the absence of legislative action. The Smith approach suffered from two
flaws that should not plague my proposal: (I) it offered no way to measure continued compliance with
caseload standards; and (2) it embraced a case-by-case inquiry for ineffective assistance of counsel,
rather than a bright-line rule, thus putting the onus on trial judges rather than the legislature. For a
discussion of these problems, see infra Part V.C.
1 2
l Smith, 681 P.2d at 1381.
Ill /d. at 1384.
134
Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1741 .
Ill

mid.
16
l E.g., Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d
1109 (Aa. 1986); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983). These decisions support one of the
premises of this article: the best chance for ameliorating indigent defense through the courts is if the
judiciary makes bright-line rulings in their traditional areas of competence, such as striking down
particular statutory provisions as being unconstitutional. See infra Part V.C. For other smaller-scale
victories, see Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that failure to compensate
attorneys for representing indigents amounts to a taking); DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d
437 (Alaska 1987) (same). Additionally, a handful of other states have adopted legislation in an effort
to improve the provision of the right to counsel. As scholars cautiously have observed, however,
"[s]ince these changes are still in their infancy, their efficacy cannot easily be measured." Backus &
Marcus, supra note I, at 1103.
1 7
l There also have been thought-provoking scholarly proposals that have not been adopted by
courts. For instance, Professor Richard Klein has suggested that trial judges hold a pre-trial conference
to review, inter alia, pre-trial discovery, the number of times the lawyer has met with his client, and the
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IV. RAISING THE STANDARD OF PROOF

Because prior proposals have failed to motivate legislatures to improve
indigent defense funding, I suggest an alternate approach that focuses on a
bright-line rule that is particularly within the province of the judiciary: a
higher standard of proof. After briefly reviewing the history of the
reasonable doubt standard, I argue that state courts should respond to the
under-funding of indigent defense by adopting a default rule that raises the
standard of proof to "beyond all doubt" for cases involving indigent
defendants.
A. The Long History of the Reasonable Doubt Standard

Since the earliest days of American history, courts have required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to convict criminal defendants. 138 And
although no specific clause of the U.S. Constitution requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court implicitly has accepted the
formulation for decades. 139 Finally, in 1970, after a lower court tried to
utilize a lower standard of proof in cases involving juveniles, the Supreme
Court specifically held that there is a constitutional guarantee for the
"accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." 140
Despite its long history, the reasonable doubt concept has not remained
entirely static. Scholars have demonstrated that the language used to
describe "reasonable doubt" has softened, thus arguably lowering the
standard of proof. 141 In the founding period, reasonable doubt was equated
legal issues that need to be researched. In the alternative, Professor Klein suggested that judges require
lawyers to complete a written worksheet indicating what steps they have taken during the
representation. Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 580-82 (1988). As
Professor Klein recognized, the likely reason this proposal has not been adopted is that holding such
conferences or reviewing worksheets would be time-consuming and would "meet resistance in an
already over-burdened system." /d. at 581.
138
See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden
of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1165, 1190 (2003)
(noting the use of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in the trial of British soldiers involved in
the Boston Massacre).
139
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,525-26 (1958) ("Where one party has at stake an interest
of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by
the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first
instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
140
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
141
See Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 52
(2005) [hereinafter Lillquist, Absolute) ("[B]oth the standard of proof stated by judges and the standard
of proof applied by jurors appear to be weaker than what was understood to be required by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt at the beginning of the nineteenth century.") (emphasis omitted); Sheppard,
supra note 138, at 1239 ("Over time, the loss of our understanding of moral certainty and the increasing
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with "moral certainty." 142 Today some courts continue to instruct juries
that they must find the defendant guilty to a moral certainty, but the
Supreme Court has frowned on such instructions. 143 In the absence of clear
guideposts from the Supreme Court, different jurisdictions have embraced
varied terminology to instruct juries on the meaning of reasonable doubt. 144
Yet, while there has been great variation (and difficulty) in defining
reasonable doubt, the use of the standard itself is largely uncontroversial. 145
While the reasonable doubt standard remains largely unquestioned, a
handful of commentators have suggested imposing a higher "no doubt"
standard (or some variation) in capital cases. 146 This "no doubt" standard
was recently endorsed by the Massachusetts Governor's Council on
Capital Punishment, which had been empanelled to recommend a fair and
accurate death-penalty system. 147 A primary justification for the "no
doubt" standard in capital cases is that it would serve to minimize the
number of wrongful convictions. 148 As explained below, a higher standard
acceptance of articulability as a basis for reasonableness underscored a great shift in thinking about
judgment by a juror. The courts have moved the jurors' goal from a vote for the state if the state can
convince them of a fact to a vote for the state unless the defense can convince them of a certain type of
doubt.").
142
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. I, II (1994); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REv. 105, Ill (1999).
143
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam); see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 37
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the "moral certainty" terminology
because it could lead jurors "to believe that they could base their decision to convict upon moral
standards or emotion in addition to or instead of evidentiary standards").
144
See Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295, 301-17 (2003)
(discussing the different definitions courts use and that some courts do not define reasonable doubt at
all).
145
See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 85, 112-17 (2002). "The complete lack of controversy that
surrounds the reasonable doubt standard implies that we are pretty happy with the way the standard
operates." /d. at 190--91.
146
See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 397-99 (2002), available at
http://ww2.Iaw.cololumbia.edu/brokensystemllreport.pdf. For various articles noting the imposition of
a higher "no doubt" standard see generally Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal
Concerning the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25 (1996); Elizabeth R. Jungman, Note, Beyond All Doubt,
91 GEO. L.J. 1065 (2003); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the
Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 41
(2001); Lillquist, supra note 141; Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible
Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May Be Death?, 78 CHI.
KENT L. REv. 1359 (2003 ).
147
See MAsSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT 22
(2004), available at http://www.rnass.gov/Agov2/docs/5-3-04+MassDPReportFinal.pdf ("At the
sentencing stage of the capital trial, as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, ... the jury
should be required to find that there is 'no doubt' about the defendant's guilt of capital murder."). For
a discussion of the problem associated with raising the standard of proof in capital cases, see the
thoughtful commentary by the Council's co-chairman and noted death-penalty scholar. See Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Protecting the Innocent: The Massachusetts Governor's Council Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 561, 573 (2005) ("[A]ny further shifting of the balance in favor of the capital defendant
inevitably will produce even more 'false negatives' than it will eliminate 'false positives."').
148
Other commentators have argued for less drastic revisions of the standard of proof in criminal

HeinOnline -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 108 2007-2008

2007]

RAISE THE PROOF

109

of proof to convict indigent defendants could also reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions, while at the same time serving to create incentives to
increase funding for indigent defense.

B. The Argument for Raising the Standard of Proof in Indigency Cases
1. The Proposal
The proposal to raise the standard of proof to convict indigent
defendants calls for action at the state-court level. When litigators
challenge indigent defense systems they often ask courts to make factual
findings or legal conclusions that the indigent defense systems are
unconstitutionally under-funded. 149 For courts that have made such a
finding, the next step is to determine a remedy. Rather than ordering the
legislature to provide more funding or subjecting the system to a structural
injunction, courts could impose a blanket rule raising the standard of proof
to "beyond all doubt" for all indigent defendants prosecuted from that day
forward. In recognition of the fact that indigent defendants receive far less
funding (and far less attorney competence) to support their defenses, the
government would face a tougher standard to convict them. As I lay out
below in Part V, the higher standard of proof would be a default rule that
the legislature could opt out of by providing adequate funding. 150

2. Why a Higher Standard ofProof Passes Constitutional Muster
Critics might complain that a higher standard of proof is
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in 1970
that the Constitution requires the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
in criminal cases.
This objection is without merit though.
In
constitutionalizing the reasonable doubt standard, the Court adopted a

cases. Professor Lawrence Solan, while not advocating the abandonment of the reasonable doubt
standard, has argued that it does not focus sufficiently on the government's burden of proof, therefore
making it easier for jurors to convict defendants in weak cases that should probably result in acquittals.
Solan, supra note 142, at 132. Accordingly, he suggests that courts should re-direct focus to the
government's case by instructing jurors to be "firmly convinced," rather than focusing on doubts that
support the defendant. !d. at 145-47. Similarly, the Federal Judicial Center has proposed defining
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as proof that leaves you "firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt."
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATIERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCfiONS 28 (1987). This standard has been
endorsed by such prominent judges as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Judge Jon 0. Newman. See
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. I, 26-27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,991 (1993).
149
See, e.g., Quitman County v. State, 910 So. 2d 1032, 1039, 1047-48 (Miss. 2005) (rejecting
plaintiffs claim that indigent defense was under-funded).
150
In certain respects, the proposal resembles the inverse of certain provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which encourages states to opt into a more
favorable procedural posture by providing funding for counsel during state habeas corpus proceedings.
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 2261, 110 Stat.
1221-22 (1996). I am grateful to Toby Heytens for making this point to me.
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floor, not a ceiling. 151 There is nothing in the United States Constitution to
prohibit judges from requiring a higher standard of proof in cases where
they believe it is necessary. 152 Indeed, the Constitution does not explicitly
provide any particular standard of proof, and the Court imposed the
reasonable doubt standard to satisfy due process guarantees. Given that it
is now clear that indigent defendants are not receiving adequate protections
from their appointed counsel at trial, the Due Process Clause could be
construed to require a heightened standard of proof. Moreover, even if
state judges did not believe that the United States Constitution served as a
basis for imposing a higher standard of proof, they easily could rely instead
on their state constitutions because there is no requirement that state
constitutions be interpreted co-terminously with the Constitution of the
United States. 153
Furthermore, the proposal does not run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause. While wealthy defendants (who retain their own counsel) will be
treated less favorably than poor defendants-by being subjected to a lower
standard of proof-the Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a suspect
classification. 154 Thus, the rule would be subjected to rational basis
scrutiny and would survive review so long as there is a legitimate
governmental purpose and the rule is rationally related to that purpose. 155
Ensuring that indigent defendants are adequately represented and receive a
fair opportunity to demonstrate their innocence is certainly a legitimate
governmental purpose. And increasing the burden of proof to convict
those defendants is rationally related to that goal.
Not only would the "beyond all doubt" standard be constitutional, it
would also make sense as a matter of remedies jurisprudence. Notably, the
proposal does not require courts to impose a higher standard of proof in all
cases or in a vacuum. Rather, the "beyond all doubt" formulation would
not be imposed until a state court first makes a finding that an indigent
defense system has been unconstitutionally under-funded. Courts long
have embraced more flexibility when remedying long-term misconduct.
lSI See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 585 (2005)
(explaining that "the Constitution acts as a floor that limits certain state experimentation").
12
s See Sand & Rose, supra note 146, at 1362-63 (explaining that courts have long recognized,
consistent with the Constitution, various standards of proof and that "the more important the interest,
the more certainty required in the accuracy of the adjudication").
ISJ See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977) (noting that state courts often extend, via state constitutions, greater rights
than the federal Constitution affords).
Is• San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
Iss See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 491 (1955) (applying rational
basis review). Furthermore, while it is true that the great majority of indigent defendants are AfricanAmerican, and thus white defendants will be disproportionately saddled with the Jess rigorous
reasonable doubt standard, disparate effects, by themselves, are not enough to nullify a governmental
action. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Rather, there must be a discriminatory
purpose, and none is demonstrated here.
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For instance, in affirmative action cases, courts are far more likely to
permit racial preferences if there has been a history of discrimination than
if the preferences were adopted in the abstract. 156 The same approach
applies here. The proposal to raise the standard of proof would not be
advanced because courts think it is an abstractly useful idea, but rather to
remedy the long-standing problem of under-funding indigent defense in
particular jurisdictions.
C. Anticipating Objections to a Higher Standard ofProof
While a proposal to raise the standard of proof to convict indigent
defendants is constitutional, there are serious objections that can be raised.
First, as Professor Erik Lillquist recently has argued in the context of
death-penalty cases, there is reason to believe that "the existing reasonable
doubt jury instructions have almost no impact on juror's [sic] decisionmaking."157 Studies demonstrate that a substantial percentage of jurors
already wrongly perceive a higher standard of proof than the reasonable
doubt standard requires. 158 By contrast, other jurors mistakenly apply a
lower standard of proof-even after being read the reasonable doubt
instruction. 159 More alarmingly, studies demonstrate that jurors might be
less likely to ·convict under the lower clear and convincing standard of
proof than under the reasonable doubt formulation. 160 And still more social
science research demonstrates that jurors simply do not understand
substantial portions of what they are being told at all. 161 Moreover, when
156
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-09 (1989) (holding that a
governmental plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy discrimination because the existence of past
discrimination was unclear); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) ("It is now well
established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination."); see also
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15 (1971) (authorizing busing to remedy
discrimination by explaining that "[ o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad").
157
Lillquist, Absolute, supra note 141, at 47,78-84.
158
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury
Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 401, 402, 414 (1990) (studying 600 actual jurors and finding that a majority of "uninstructed
jurors revealed a belief that any doubt (or, alternatively, anything less than 100% certainty) is
equivalent to reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt instructions apparently did little to improve jurors'
understanding that absolute certainty is not required") (citation omitted).
159
See Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59,98 fig.13 (1998) (finding that
nearly I 0% of recent criminal jurors believed the burden of proof on prosecutors was "more likely than
not" and that another 6% were "not sure" whether that was the correct standard of proof).
160
See Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions ofStandards of
Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 162, 165 (1985) (finding, inter alia, that California jury
instructions led sample jurors to convict more easily under the reasonable doubt standard than the clear
and convincing evidence standard); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM.
L. REv. 208, 218-19 (finding the same phenomenon present with a "balance of probabilities" standard
vis-a-vis reasonable doubt).
161
See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCfiONS UNDERSTANDABLE 12
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we consider that jurors come to court with preconceived notions based on
what they have read in the newspaper or watched on "Law and Order," a
"beyond all doubt" instruction would have a lot of baggage to overcome. 162
Accordingly, critics have some basis to contend that imposing a higher
standard of proof might have limited effect. 163
However, while the social science research is startling, it does not
demonstrate that a "beyond all doubt" instruction would be ineffective.
Indeed, any competent defense lawyer would harp on the instruction
during her closing argument and point out that it is higher than the
traditional reasonable doubt standard. 164 As even a skeptical observer has
conceded, "the very novelty of the no-doubt standard will make it more
salient and thus perhaps more likely to be heard and/or understood by the
jurors." 165
Assuming that a higher standard of proof would have an effect on
jurors' decisions, critics could next complain that the standard will result in
setting free more guilty defendants. 166 There is some merit to this
objection because freeing the guilty carries a high cost. 167 If the higher
standard of proof resulted in droves of guilty defendants going free and
only a handful of innocent defendants (who would otherwise have been
(1982) (concluding that jurors in some states understand only about half of the legal instructions
presented by a judge); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 205,219 (1989) (determining that jurors understood about half of the instructions they received
at trial); Alan Reifman eta!., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 539 (1992) (same); Lawrence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of
Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 153, 179-81
(1982) (evaluating jurors' comprehension-levels when given no instructions, general instructions and
specific instructions); see also Lillquist, supra note 145, at 112-17 (discussing sources demonstrating
that jurors do not perceive reasonable doubt to be a "high, fixed standard").
162
See Lillquist, supra note 141, at 82 (noting that jurors "connect to the courtroom with their
own preconceptions about what the standard of proof in criminal case should be ... ").
163
See id. at 47 (contending that a higher burden of proof would have "little or no effect in real
world cases"). But see Norbert L. Kerr et a!., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept
Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 282, 291 (1976) (studying mock jurors and finding that a less rigorous description of
reasonable doubt led to higher conviction rates, while a more stringent definition of reasonable doubt
led to fewer convictions).
164
The very premise of this Article casts some doubt on this point, however, because we cannot
assume that unimpressive or over-worked appointed attorneys will do an adequate job during closing
arguments. See Lillquist, Absolute, supra note 141, at 80 n.J38 (noting that attorneys are motivated to
emphasize instructions that favor their clients and that incompetence plays a role in closing arguments).
The counter-argument is that even the worst criminal defense attorneys can point out that the standard
of proof is the very high "beyond all doubt" standard.
165
/d. at 84 n.153.
166
Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("If, for example, the
standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but
a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent.").
167
See Lillquist, Absolute, supra note 141, at 66 ("Advocates who wish to justify a higher
standard of proof [in capital cases] ... need to be clearer about why the harms are so much higher in
capital cases that they justify a much higher standard of proof.").
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convicted) being exonerated, the benefits might not outweigh the costs.
Yet, the calculus is difficult to analyze because there is no data on the
number of guilty defendants who would go free under a beyond all doubt
standard, nor on the number of innocent defendants who would be saved
from wrongful convictions.
However, if the social science evidence discussed above is to be
believed, the standard of proof, while having some effect on jurors'
decision-making, may not have a dramatic effect. 168 Accordingly, the
number of wrongful exonerations may well be low. Conversely, in
assessing the benefits of the higher standard of proof, we must consider not
only exonerations linked to the beyond all doubt standard, but also the
systemic benefits that will result from states opting out of the higher
burden of proof. As explained below in Part V, the beyond all doubt
standard would be a default rule that legislatures could opt out of by
ensuring adequate indigent defense funding. Although it is unclear
whether the higher standard of proof would make prosecutors' jobs
dramatically more difficult, that will certainly be the perception by the
public and by most prosecutors. Accordingly, legislatures will be under
pressure to opt out of the rule by properly funding their indigent defense
systems. And by properly funding indigent defense, legislatures will
improve representation for indigent defendants, thus reducing the risk of
wrongful convictions, while conferring other benefits on the criminal
justice system. 169
Third, critics might ask why indigent defense is special. If a higher
standard of proof is to be applied in indigent defense cases, then why not in
capital cases, or complicated securities fraud prosecutions, or cases in
which there is no eyewitness or no DNA evidence? 170 Put simply, why
should indigent defendants be afforded a more beneficial standard than
other defendants? 171
There are two possible responses. First, indigent defense systems are
in such crisis that additional procedural regulation is merited. While
securities fraud cases might be more complicated or death-penalty cases
might be more important, those defendants are already protected in other
168
See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text (discussing objections to a higher standard of
proof and empirical evidence of jurors' misunderstanding of the current standard of proof).
169
By "other benefits" I mean to suggest that there is more at stake than simply convicting the
guilty and acquitting the innocent. For instance, a properly funded judicial system confers greater
legitimacy on the conviction and imprisonment of individuals, demonstrating that the United States is
an advanced democracy that takes criminal defendants' rights seriously.
170
See Newman, supra note 148, at 998-1000 (arguing for "heightened scrutiny" in cases
involving eyewitness testimony and uncorroborated testimony of accomplices because of the
heightened risk of wrongful conviction, not "simply to tilt the balance of criminal justice a shade more
favorably toward defendants").
171
See Lillquist, supra note 141, at 70 (questioning why a higher burden of proof would be
applicable in capital cases, but not other criminal cases).
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ways. There are already a myriad of procedures in place in death-penalty
cases. 172 Defendants in complex white-collar cases are ahead of the game
because such cases are harder to investigate and prove at trial and because
such defendants can almost always afford to hire private counsel. 173 By
contrast, without a higher standard of proof, there is little to protect
indigent defendants represented by overworked or incompetent
government-funded lawyers.
No defendant can receive adequate
representation when his lawyer has nearly 200 other open cases and no
time to devote to preparing a defense. Second, the sheer magnitude of the
problem merits special attention. Close to eighty percent of criminal
defendants are indigent. 174 In jurisdictions where indigent representation is
in crisis, that means that up to four out of five defendants are being denied
a fair shake. Such terrible numbers merit additional attention from the
judiciary.
Finally, critics might complain that imposing a higher standard of
proof would not address the core problem with the under-funding of
indigent defense, because the vast majority of criminal cases are plea
bargained and never proceed to trial where the standard of proof would
matter. This objection is without merit, however, because imposing a
"beyond all doubt" standard of proof would change the parameters of the
plea bargaining process. Defendants who are alerted to the heightened
standard of proof will be more likely to expect exoneration at trial and
therefore less likely to plea bargain. 175 A higher standard of proof
therefore would force prosecutors to offer more favorable plea bargains or
to take more cases to trial. Accordingly, the heightened standard of proof
would have a significant systemic impact. As explained below, that impact
would spur improvement in indigent defense funding. 176

172

Of course, scholars have argued convincingly that the extra procedural rules in death-penalty
cases offer little actual protection to defendants. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment,
109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 360 (1995) ("the [Supreme] Court's chosen path of death penalty
regulation ... creates an impression of enormous regulatory effort but achieves negligible regulatory
effects.").
173
See JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (2d ed. 2003)
("The white collar crime defense attorney, in contrast, enters the picture substantially before the
government has completed its investigation and sometimes before the investigation has even begun ...
Counsel's first line of defense accordingly is 'information control,' which entails keeping documents
away from and preventing clients and witnesses from talking to government investigators, prosecutors,
and judges." (citing KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PoRTRAIT OF
ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1983))).
174
See Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CH!.-KENTL. REv. 583,583 (19951996) ("Estimates of the percentage of criminal defendants represented by appointed counsel . . .
generally hover around seventy-five to eighty percent.").
175
See Bibas, supra note 77, at 2499 ("If one side overestimates the chances of winning at trial, it
is like!~ to make unreasonable settlement offers and to reject reasonable offers.").
16
See infra Part V.C.
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V. THE DEFAULT RULE SOLUTION

Having argued in favor of raising the standard of proof to deal with the
crisis in indigent defense funding, it is prudent to leave a wide escape hatch
that encourages the legislatures to opt out of the judicial remedy. Courts
have made clear that they do not want to be in the business of supervising
indigent defense systems or ordering particular sums of money to be spent,
and legislatures no doubt agree. 177 Whenever possible, it is preferable to
encourage legislators to take a policyrnaking rule, rather than relying on
courts. Accordingly, designing a default rule that allows legislatures to
control their destiny by opting out of the "beyond all doubt" standard of
proof is preferable.
A. Two Options for Opting Out of the Higher Standard of Proof

The default rule would operate as follows. In the frrst indigent defense
case of the calendar year, a state court, upon motion by the defendant,
would consider whether the indigent defense system is unconstitutionally
under-funded. 178 If the court were to find the system to be under-funded, it
then would impose a remedy whereby all indigent defendants could be
convicted only upon proof beyond all doubt. Assuming that the trial
court's decision were upheld on appeal, legislatures thereafter would have
the option to opt out of the higher standard of proof by demonstrating
either that: (1) the caseloads of government-funded defense lawyers do not
exceed the recommended guideposts set by the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, or (2) the funds
appropriated for indigent defense are equal to the funds appropriated for
prosecutors' offices.
1. Keeping Caseloads Under Control

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals has recommended that defense counsel not handle more than 150
111
See Wright, supra note 9, at 252 ("Courts also shy away from remedies that dictate to the
legislature a method of addressing a legal violation, particularly when they require the legislature to
appropriate public money."). Professor Stuntz has argued that if the judiciary ordered money to be
spent on indigent defense "(n)o judicial micromanagement would be necessary." Stuntz, supra note 8,
at 70. Courts and legislatures do not appear to agree, however.
178
An alternative, though less attractive, approach would be for a criminal defendant to file a civil
action seeking a declaration that the indigent defense system is unconstitutionally under-funded and
requesting that the standard of proof be raised to remedy the problem. Such an approach would be
similar to the continuing structural injunctions issued in cases involving school desegregation and
prison conditions. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 17, at 552-53 (discussing injunctions and
desegregation). The declaratory judgment route is less attractive because it is at least one-step removed
from the criminal case. First, overworked public defenders and appointed lawyers are less likely to
take the added step of filing a separate civil action. Second, civil actions are more likely to become
bogged down in time-consuming discovery, thus delaying prompt improvements. Third, a civil action
will often be heard by a judge that does not handle many (or even any) criminal cases, thus creating a
steep and time-consuming learning curve for the court.
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felony cases or 400 misdemeanor cases per year. 179 This guidepost is
widely accepted and has been endorsed by the National Legal Aid
Defender Association and cited approvingly by the American Bar
Association. 180
To bring caseloads within the National Advisory Commission's
guideposts, legislatures would have a number of options. They could
appropriate more funding, thus making it possible for public defender
offices to hire adequate staff as well as enabling courts to pay higher rates
Another
that would attract greater numbers of appointed counsel.
possibility would be for legislatures to keep indigent defense funding static
while providing incentives for prosecutors to reduce the number of
criminal charges they bring, thus reducing defense caseloads.
Alternatively, legislatures could decriminalize high volume offenses (such
as drug possession), which would reduce the number of criminal cases and,
in tum, the need for defense counsel. In a political world that prizes being
tough on crime, these latter solutions seem implausible. In all likelihood,
caseload guideposts with some teeth would encourage legislatures to
(grudgingly) appropriate more money for indigent defense so that more
defense lawyers could be hired.
Once a court has tied the standard of proof to caseload limits, the next
problem becomes ensuring that there is compliance with the guideposts.
The judiciary has neither the time, the resources, nor the ability to
adequately analyze entire indigent defense systems on a regular basis. And
courts will not want to be in the business of holding numerous fact-finding
hearings to determine whether lawyers are actually following the caseload
guideposts. Fortunately, many states already have organizations with the
time and expertise to review defense lawyers' caseloads: indigent defense
commissions.
More than three-quarters of the states have created commissions or
boards to recommend best practices for the defense of the poor. 181 The
members of the indigent defense commissions are typically appointed by
the Governor, the state supreme court, and the legislature, and they come
from a wide array of the community, including the judiciary, the executive
branch, the criminal defense bar, and sometimes the business world. 182
179

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 34, at
Standard 13 .12.
180
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. While the National Advisory Commission
caseload standards are widely cited, they are far from perfect. They do not appear to have been derived
from any empirical formula, and instead approximate a "best guess" of what reasonable caseloads
should be. Nevertheless, in the absence of more authoritative standards, I rely on them as the best
existing source.
181
See generally THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: 2005
(2005) (describing the commissions' makeup and responsibilities). For jurisdictions without indigent
defense commissions, the default rule would provide a strong incentive to establish such commissions.
182 /d.
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Although many of the commissions lack the budget to effect much change,
some of them do succeed in improving funding, reducing caseloads, and
creating standards for indigent defense. There is near universal consensus
that such indigent defense commissions are a force for good. 183
Accordingly, they would be well-suited to making an objective
determination whether caseloads are in compliance with the National
Advisory Commission guidelines, filling a role akin to a special master. 184
Here is how the commission would work. During the year, the
commission could study caseload compliance and then-perhaps on the
anniversary of the court's decision finding the indigent defense system to
be under-funded-the commission could certify in writing whether there
has been compliance with the caseload limits. If there has been
compliance, the court would then return the standard of proof to the
reasonable doubt standard, where it would remain for the next year. The
commission would then repeat its inquiry the following year, and report to
the court again. Should the commission find that the jurisdiction has fallen
out of compliance with the caseload standards, the court would then reinstate the higher standard of proof, which would remain intact until
another year had expired. 185
2. Funding Parity
In addition to caseload compliance, courts could establish funding
parity as a method to opt out of the higher burden of proof. Put simply, if
legislatures provide the same funding for indigent defense counsel that
they do for prosecutors, then the higher burden of proof can be
eliminated. 186 Yet, for funding parity, the devil is in the details.
Legislatures do not simply appropriate $100 million for prosecutors and
$70 million for indigent defense and call it a day.
Rather, the
investigation, prosecution, and defense of criminal activity are funded in a
host of manners through numerous budget lines. Money is appropriated
183
See Malia Brink, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, May 2005, at *30, *31, available at Lexis,
News Library, CHAMP File (explaining that indigent defense commissions serve to establish eligibility
and qualification requirements, attorney performance standards, while managing the indigent defense
system).
184
See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 12, at 1750 (suggesting that courts appoint special
masters to order funding and review caseloads).
185
One downside of relying on a numerical measurement such as caseloads is that it can be
manipulated through other outlets. For example, judges who want to leave the conventional standard of
proof intact might be more aggressive in asking defendants if they want to waive their right to counsel.
In the alternative, judges might be more rigorous in ensuring that defendants meet the statutory
definition of indigency before appointing free lawyers. See Gershowitz, supra note 151, at 583-84
(discussing the extremely low-income levels statutorily required for the appointment of a free lawyer in
many states). I am grateful to Ron Wright for raising these points.
186
See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 70-71 ("Unlike prison cases, testing compliance with judicial
decrees [to provide funding for defense lawyers] would seem to be easy: Either the required
appropriations were made or they weren't.").
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not only for prosecution and public defender offices, but also for police
departments, crime labs, appointed counsel, and sheriff's departments.
And to make matters more complicated, many jurisdictions receive
supplemental funding from federal, state, and local governments.
Moreover, prosecutors and defense lawyers are not in identical
postures. Prosecutors must handle all criminal activity, whereas public
defenders or appointed counsel deal only with the roughly eighty percent
of criminal defendants who cannot afford private lawyers. 187 In that
respect, there is a need for greater funding for prosecutors. At the same
time however, it is prosecutors, not government-funded defense lawyers,
who are likely to benefit from extra budget lines such as the separate
funding of police (who pursue leads for prosecutors) 188 and crime labs,
which not only investigate but also provide crucial trial support to
prosecutors in the form of testifying witnesses and expert reports. 189
Moreover, it is prosecutors, not defense lawyers, who are likely to receive
additional funding from federal, state or local governments. 190
In the end, the best we can hope to achieve is rough parity, whereby
the extra cases handled by prosecutors (but not government-funded defense
lawyers) are offset by the extra resources that prosecutors receive from
separate budget lines. As such, and once again in the interest of simplicity,
parity should entail equal funding between prosecutors' offices on the one
187

HARLOW, supra note 25, at I.
While prosecutors benefit from investigative work conducted by police agencies, it would be a
gross overstatement to suggest that prosecutors have control over those agencies. For an analysis of the
complexity of these relationships, see Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 751-53 (2003).
189
See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: UnderfUnded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 395 (1995) ("Funding for the support services
essential to the preparation of the prosecutor's case--police investigation, FBI and local crime labs,
and state and local forensic experts--does not come out of the budget for the prosecutor's office, while
analogous expenses by the defense must be paid out of the money provided for defense services.").
190
See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 42 ("[V]irtually no federal funds are
allocated for defense services in the fifty states."); CAROL DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS 4 (2001) ("Over a third of the [prosecutors] offices indicated that
some portion of their budget came from grant funds."); IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
supra note 26, at 54 (explaining that a Louisiana prosecutor's office funded an "$850,000 renovation,
including all new computers with high-speed internet access" primarily through federal grants, whereas
the indigent defense office received no comparable funding and was in "disarray"); VIRGINIA REPORT,
supra note 4, at 35 (noting that "[m]any Commonwealth's attorney offices receive supplemental funds
from local governments ..." whereas "just two public defender offices in the state receive local
support"); Wallace, supra note 4, at 17 ("Congress appropriated $100 million for fiscal year 2001 to
allow states to hire 'community prosecutors.' Though the amounts of proposed federal support are
very substantial, the proposals never include matching funds for the constitutionally mandated
provision of legal representation services in the new cases which will be filed by the new
prosecutors."). To make up for the lack of funding for indigent defense, many jurisdictions have turned
to recoupment and application fees that require indigent defendants to fund their appointed lawyers, at
least in part, either before or after their cases are resolved. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan,
The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2045, 2047 (2006) (explaining that, often against the will of their members, defense organizations,
support recoupment and application fees out of budgetary and political necessity).
188
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hand and the amount spent on public defenders' offices and appointed
counsel on the other hand. 191 At the granular level, this should mean
identical salaries for public defenders and district attorneys. At the macro
level, it should mean identical appropriations for prosecution funding and
defense funding. 192
B. Would the Legislature Opt Out of the Default Rule?

A default rule that raises the standard of proof in the absence of
legislative action will create a vastly better incentive structure than prior
judicial decisions that have attempted to improve indigent defense on a
case-by-case basis. Prosecutors will see the beyond all doubt standard of
proof as a threat to their ability to attain convictions, and they will pressure
legislators to take whatever steps are necessary to eliminate the higher
standard of proof. And even in the absence of such pressure, legislatures
acting out of self-interest will want to take credit for removing an
undesirable legal rule that will hinder the incarceration of criminals.
1. Prosecutors ' Incentives to Lobby for Opting Out of the Default Rule
First and quite simply, no litigator wants to lose. 193 Prosecutors,
perhaps even more so than civil litigators, are aggressive lawyers who
value their reputations, believe in their cause, and want to win. 194
Prosecutors will likely view a higher standard of proof in eighty percent of
their cases as unfairly stacking the deck against them. Thus, in the abstract
alone, prosecutors likely will lobby the legislature to remove what they see
as an injustice.
More importantly, the incentive for prosecutors to lobby the legislature
goes beyond mere philosophical objections. Most district attorneys are
elected and must answer to the voters. 195 In their re-election campaigns,
prosecutors often stress their conviction rates and highlight their high-

191
Although the goal is bright-line rules, courts will have to dig into at least some of the details to
ensure that legislatures are not playing games with the budget to make it falsely appear that defense
funding is equal to prosecutorial funding .
191
Identical funding would be easier to accomplish from a logistical standpoint if all jurisdictions
used public defenders to provide indigent defense, because legislatures could then simply provide equal
funding for both prosecutor and defense offices. However, a substantial number of jurisdictions assign
appointed counsel on an individual basis in lieu of public defender offices. See Robert L. Spangenberg
& Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS . 31,
31 (1995) (noting that some states have public defender programs and others rely on the bar for
acceptance of court appointments). And given that demographics and traditions vary by jurisdiction, a
one-size fits all public defender approach might not be the best option for all jurisdictions.
193
Stuntz, supra note 19, at 534.
194
See Bibas, supra note 77, at 2472 ("Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their
reputations ... [and] [l)osses at trial hurt prosecutors' public images.").
195
See CAROL DEFRANCES & GREG W. STEADMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN
STA'ffi COURTS 1 (1996) (explaining that more than 95% of chief prosecutors are elected).
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profile prosecutions. I%
Voters respond well to such posturing,
demonstrating that their prime desire is for convictions and punishment. 197
A higher standard of proof endangers prosecutors' grandstanding because
convictions will be harder to come by. Not only will it be harder to prove
defendants guilty "beyond all doubt" at trial, but defendants who are
alerted to the heightened standard of proof will be more likely to expect
exoneration at trial and therefore less likely to plea bargain. 198 Because
ninety-five percent of defendants plea bargain under the current system,
any significant reduction will have serious repercussions. 199 Fewer guilty
pleas will force prosecutors to bring more cases to trial, further diffusing
already limited resources and thus making it harder to prevail at trial. 200 In
the alternative, prosecutors would have to dismiss more charges, or offer
defendants better plea deals to entice them to abandon the hopes for
success at trial that they developed as a result of the higher standard of
proof.20I
Put simply, the result of a higher standard of proof likely will be more
losses at trial, an increased number of voluntary dismissals, and fewer
favorable plea bargains. That translates into less grandstanding and more
negative publicity about dangerous criminals beating the rap, which in turn
endangers prosecutors' re-election prospects. Accordingly, prosecutors
will either need to work much harder to overcome the obstacles created by
the higher standard of proof or, more likely, they will lobby to have the
offending rule removed. 202
And when prosecutors lobby to remove the higher standard of proof,
legislatures are likely to listen. First, legislatures are inclined to give

196

See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI-TRffiUNE, Jan. 14,
1999 at Nl, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHTRIB File ("[P]rosecutors recite conviction rates
like bol\ers touting won-loss records.... ").
197
See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 533-34.
198
See supra note 175 and accompanying tellt.
199
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137,
145 (2005).
200
See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1941 (1992) ("[A]djudication costs are both high and disproportionately allocated to prosecutors.
Prosecutors bear the burden of proof and therefore must invest more in digging out and presenting
evidence."). Indeed, as Professor Stuntz has observed, docket and funding pressures already result in
"prosecutors in most jurisdictions hav[ing] more cases than they have time to handle .... " William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2555
(2004).
201
See Bibas, supra note 77, at 2473-75 (arguing that caseloads and many factors other than the
strength of the evidence affect the amount and the generosity of plea bargains); Frank 0. Bowman m
& Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences
Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REv. 477, 544 (2002) (ellamining national drug
sentencing statistics and concluding, inter alia, that "increased [Assistant United States Attorney]
caseload correlated with decreased average drug sentence[s]").
202
See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 537-38 (ellplaining that prosecutors lobby for legislation that
"makes it cheaper for prosecutors to do their job").
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prosecutors what they want because their interests are aligned.
Just like
prosecutors, legislators want to highlight convictions and punishment that
occurred on their watch. Second, legislators will listen to district
attorneys' demands because they will fear the consequences. Prosecutors
frequently seek higher office, and the failure of legislators to eliminate
obstacles to convicting defendants will provide a good campaign issue for
the district attorneys. 204
2. Legislators' Independent Incentives to Opt Out

Even without lobbying by prosecutors, legislators will independently
desire to eliminate the higher standard of proof. Because voters do not
have a nuanced view of the intricacies of criminal law and procedure, they
look to high-profile cases or prominent and comprehensible criminal
procedure rules to assess the state of criminal justice. 205 When bad news
occurs-usually in the form of high-profile crimes-the voters demand
action. In response, politicians signal their bona fides through tough-oncrime rhetoric and symbolic legislation. 206 As Professor Bill Stuntz has
explained, the legislative response usually takes the form of creating new
crimes "to give voters the sense that they are doing something about it." 207
There is every reason to believe this general paradigm will apply to a
default rule raising the standard of proof. While voters might not
understand the nuances of judicial decisions affecting the federal
sentencing guidelines or procedural default rules for habeas corpus
proceedings, they will understand headlines trumpeting "Court Raises
Standard of Proof in Most Crimirlal Cases to 'Beyond All Doubt' But
Invites Legislature To Intervene." It is not difficult to predict the public's
response. Most voters will equate a higher standard of proof with more
criminals going free and escaping punishment, the exact opposite of their
preference for more convictions.
203
See id. at 534 ("If police and prosecutors want some new criminal prohibition, they likely want
it because it would advance their goals. Advancing police and prosecutors' goals usually means
advancing legislators' goals as well."). But see Wright & Logan, supra note 190, at 2069 (explaining
that there are "more complex settings" in which the interests of prosecutors and legislators are not
aligned). With respect to a higher burden of proof, there is little question that prosecutors and
legislators would be unified in their opposition.
204
Think of Arlen Specter, John Cornyn, Elliot Spitzer and Rudolph Guliani, to name just a few
prominent examples. See Bibas, Plea Bargaining, supra note 77, at 2472 (collecting additional
examgles).
05
See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 748-49 (2005)
("Cognitive psychology teaches that when voters think of crime and sentencing, they tend to think of
examples of crimes that are most salient. Because most voters have no direct experience with crime,
their impressions are formed largely from the media.") (citations omitted}. For a detailed analysis of
the reasons behind public misperception of crime, see Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Gotto Do With It?
The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM . L. REV. 23 (1997).
206
See Stuntz., supra note 19, at 53 I (noting the legislature's goal of taking symbolic stands).
207
/d. at 532.
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Responding to public opinion, legislatures will move quickly to opt out
of the beyond all doubt rule. Legislatures would be more than happy to
enact a symbolic statute that returns the standard of proof to the traditional
reasonable doubt formulation. They could name it the "Restoring Justice
Act" or the "Lower Burden of Proof Act" and reap political dividends. 208
Moreover, the political costs209 of enacting the statute-funding parity with
prosecutors' offices or caseloads conforming to National Advisory
Commission standards-are minimal because the public is unlikely to be
outraged by the prosrcect of equal funding for indigent defense or
manageable caseloads. 2 0
Additionally, legislatures will be likely to opt out of the higher
standard of proof because, practically speaking, it will be easy to do so.
The default rule offers only two legislative options for eliminating the
higher standard of proof: funding parity or compliance with caseloads
guideposts. With only two approaches, legislators should find it easy to
draft the legislation.
C. A Solution That Avoids Prior Pitfalls
After so many unsuccessful efforts to improve indigent defense, the
final question should be: why is this proposal likely to succeed where
others have failed? The reason is that, unlike other efforts, the judiciary's
involvement is limited while the incentives for the legislature to act are
more direct and more pronounced.
Imposing a higher standard of proof to convict indigent defendants is a
bright-line rule that eliminates any need for the judiciary to look case-bycase at each defendant. Every indigent defendant will be subjected to the
higher standard of proof in the absence of legislative action-no
exceptions. Accordingly, unlike the Peart decision in Louisiana-which
saddled trial judges with case-by-case responsibility to determine whether
the presumption of ineffectiveness had been surmounted211 -trial judges'
lOll Consider the "bipartisan acclaim" that legislators enjoyed after enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in response to the Supreme Court' s unpopular free-exercise decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S . 872 (1990). Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L . REv. 437,438-39 (1994).
209
See, e.g ., NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 5 (2001) (finding that a majority of the public
believes indigent defendants should receive a free "lawyer with a small enough caseload to provide the
time necessary to prepare a defense for each person").
210
Of course, the public will be outraged if the increased funding for indigent defense results in
less funding for education, healthcare, and environmental protections. See Brown, supra note 45, at
809 ("Even legislators who concede indigent defense is worthy and important must still rank its priority
for marginal budget dollars relative to funds for medical care for the poor, foster care services,
improvement of substandard schools, or toxic clean-up of grave environmental health risks.").
211
The Peart rule further taxed busy trial courts by forcing them to have "Peart hearings" to
assess whether the individual lawyer in the case at bar could provide effective representation. See IN
DEFENSE OF PuBuc ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 3 n.9 (noting that "there is a significant
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hands will be tied unless the legislature acts. With all responsibility
channeled to the legislature, it will not be able to punt its obligations to
trial judges and will instead have no choice but to improve funding or take
responsibility for the higher standard of proof associated with its
inaction. 212
Moreover, while the higher standard of proof imposes direct pressure
on the legislature, it does not embroil the judiciary in time-consuming and
cumbersome supervision that is so often associated with structural reform
litigation. While judicial monitoring of indigent defense will continue
each year, the judiciary's responsibilities will be minimal. Once per year,
the state court will review the indigent defense commission's analysis of
caseload compliance or the legislature's budget to see whether there is
funding parity. If everything is in order, the court will impose the
reasonable doubt standard until the following year. If caseloads are
excessive or the legislature has failed to provide funding parity, then the
court will increase the standard of proof to "beyond all doubt" and invite
the legislature to do better the following year. Regardless of which
standard of proof the court imposes, its work will be complete until the
following year. Constant, vigilant oversight will not be necessary. Rather,
the vast amount of planning, thinking, and policymaking will remain with
the legislature-exactly where it belongs. Such an approach maximizes
institutional competence.
Furthermore, at the same time that the judiciary's involvement will be
minimal, the framework stands a much better chance of success than prior
efforts. In the handful of prior cases where lawyers successfully have
challenged the under-funding of indigent defense, the benefits stemming
from the litigation have been temporary. 213 After successful litigation,
legislatures typically respond promptly by appropriating more funding, but
in subsequent years the legislatures take no action, allowing salaries to
remain stagnant while caseloads climb. 214 Put simply, the public attention
number of Peart motions being litigated across the state"). Yet, because trial judges are under pressure
to keep their dockets moving and to see that guilty defendants are convicted, the Peart rule has caused
more headaches, rather than enabling trial judges to affect systemic change. Accordingly, today
Louisiana in general, and New Orleans in particular, are among the nation's most under-funded
indigent defense systems. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
212
There is a large body of psychological literature demonstrating that when responsibility is
diffused individuals are less likely to take socially responsible actions. See, e.g., Bibb Latane & Steve
Nida, Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 308 (1981) (noting that
presence of other persons inhibits the impulse to help). Accordingly, a rule that channels responsibility
to the correct actor-here, the legislature--is preferable.
213
See supra Parts Ill.B and III.C.
214
See Wright, supra note 9, at 249 (explaining that "[a]fter a judge orders or convinces the state
or local government to fund indigent defense at prevailing rates for the time, the world moves on.
Inflation immediately starts eroding salaries of the attorneys and greater numbers of arrests and charges
erode the gains in caseload. Over time, the old difficulties for defense attorneys return.") (citation
omitted).
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and pressure wrought by the litigation are temporary, and once they
disappear so does the legislatures' incentives to provide adequate funding.
By contrast, because the proposal advocated in this article imposes annual
monitoring, it is less likely that funding will stagnate while caseloads creep
upward. Each year, the legislature must provide funding parity or
convince the indigent defense commission that caseloads are within
accepted guidelines. Failure to do so will result in a higher standard of
proof that will be unpopular not just with prosecutors but the public at
large. Put simply, unlike the failed prior decisions, this proposal calls for
the legislature to be under pressure, year-after-year, to maintain adequate
funding.
VI. CONCLUSION

Indigent defense in America is in crisis. While prior reform efforts
have been valiant, they unfortunately have been unsuccessful. For the
most part, courts have been unwilling to inject themselves into legislative
budget decisions. When courts have become involved and have issued
favorable decisions, the benefits have been only temporary because once
the pressure of litigation disappeared so did the legislatures' desire to
appropriate more funding. A successful approach to improving indigent
defense must assuage courts' concerns about micro-managing budget
decisions, while simultaneously imposing continuous pressure on
legislatures to ensure proper funding. By imposing a higher standard of
proof as a default rule, courts can create an incentive for legislatures to opt
out by properly funding their indigent defense systems. And by limiting
the ability to opt out to bright-line annual benchmarks, courts can ensure
that improvements will not dissipate in subsequent years.
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